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Article 2

The Time Has Come for a
Restatement of Child Sex Abuse
Marci A. Hamilton†
INTRODUCTION
Child sex abuse is a widespread, persistent, and prevalent
evil that is finally getting the attention it needs in the media and
the courts. For centuries, children’s suffering on this account was
accepted, taboo, or willfully ignored. That has changed as we have
entered an era that portends a civil rights movement for children
and dramatic increases in our knowledge about the realities of
child sex abuse. The law, as usual, has been slow to catch up to
the social science and policy needs, but the time is now to bring
together the fast-advancing field of law that is assisting these
victims and improving the odds of preventing abuse and bringing
those who are responsible for it to justice.
Restatements are not only statements of black letter
law, but also “re-statements” in the sense that the Reporters
have latitude to point the way on legal developments in the
field. The time is ripe to restate the law of child sex abuse. Not
only has the law been rapidly developing over the last 20 years,
but there is now a well-developed science of child sex abuse that
informs the law and which is quite helpful for lawmakers setting
public policy and judges interpreting the law. Thus, for lawyers,
judges, policymakers, and scholars, the time has come to survey
and document the many interrelated issues on which there is
growing or even near-complete agreement and to chart the way
for the future. It is also worthwhile to highlight where courts
are struggling to find clear standards and whether legislatures
need to clarify their standards or consider new approaches.
Importantly, social science is developing at an even faster
rate than both federal and state law, with the law often laboring
† Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law. Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,
Yeshiva University. I thank Gregg Meyers for helpful comments and my team of
research assistants for their hard and excellent work for this article, including Emma
Glazer, Jeremy Ancelson, Alexander Blake, Alyssa Figueroa, William King, Tammy
Lam, Shane Martins, Danielle Nolan, and Courtney Soliday.
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to catch up to the hundreds of studies on the causes and effects
of child sex abuse, the difficulties victims face in coming forward,
the ways in which institutions perpetuate abuse, and the effects
of child pornography. The critical facts that have emerged from
the social science research include: (1) 20-25% of children are
sexually abused;1 (2) only 10% report the crime to the
authorities;2 (3) most victims (roughly 75%) are abused by people
they know well, either family members or someone outside the
family the child knows and trusts;3 (4) “Stranger Danger” cases
are relatively rare, although they get the most publicity when
they involve abduction and/or death;4 and (5) the vast majority of
victims need decades to come forward, and many never do.5 The
crime is accompanied by confusion, shame, embarrassment, fear,
and guilt, which often lead to lifelong effects including Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder, drug addiction, alcoholism, sex
addiction and disorders, difficulties with personal relationships, a
failure to fulfill one’s potential at school or on the job, and a
disproportionate number of suicides.6 These facts are critically
important for crafting the most appropriate statutes of limitations,
mandatory reporting statutes, liability for perpetrators and
institution-based abuse, protections for children abused within the
home, and rules of evidence in child sexual abuse.
This paper will summarize some of the relevant topics
that a Restatement on Child Sex Abuse Law should address.
This summary is by no means intended to cover all of the
issues that are relevant (after all, what are committees and
Reporters for?), but rather to begin to sketch out for the ALI,
lawyers, judges, and scholars some aspects of this critically
1 See Prevalence of Individual Adverse Childhood Experiences, C ENTERS
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ace/prevalence.htm (last updated
Jan. 18, 2013); see also Shanta R. Dube et al., Long-Term Consequences of Childhood Sexual
Abuse by Gender of Victim, 28 AM. J. PREV. MED. 430, 433 (2005), available at
http://www.jimhopper.com/pdfs/Dube_(2005)_Childhood_sexual_abuse_
by_gender_of_victim.pdf.
2 Statistics-Child Sexual Abuse, PARENTS FOR MEGAN’S LAW & CRIME VICTIMS
CENTER, http://www.parentsformeganslaw.org/public/statistics_childSexualAbuse.html (last
visited Sept. 24, 2013).
3 See Statistics Surrounding Child Sexual Abuse, DARKNESS TO LIGHT,
http://oldsite.d2l.org/KnowAbout/statistics_2.asp (last visited July 2, 2012).
4 Id.
5 See e.g., R.L. v. Voytac, 971 A.2d 1074, 1084 (N.J. 2009) (quoting Jones v.
Jones, 576 A.2d 316, 321 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (noting that “long after the
cycle of abuse itself has been broken, the victim will repress and deny, even to himself
or herself, what has happened”); see also Statistics-Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 2.
6 See Guy R. Holmes, Liz Offen, & Glenn Waller, See No Evil, Hear No Evil,
Speak No Evil: Why Do Relatively Few Male Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse Receive
Help for Abuse-Related Issues in Adulthood?, 17 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 69, 72-73 (1997).
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important area of the law which would benefit from a
Restatement.
I.

STATUTES OF LIMITATION FOR CHILD SEX ABUSE

A.

Introductory Material

A statute of limitations (SOL) is the maximum amount
of time one has to file charges or bring a civil lawsuit following
an injury or other ground for a lawsuit. It is quite literally the
threshold for victims’ access to justice. Statutes of limitation
vary from state to state and from claim to claim. For example,
a limitation for a lawsuit over a contract may be different from a
lawsuit about a personal injury and both may be of varying
durations across different states. The SOL may also be set to
begin running (“accrue”) at different times. Under some statutes
accrual begins at the time of the injury while others accrue only
when a victim “discovers” any injuries,7 or the causal connection
of injuries to abuse, or when the victim becomes aware of
information third parties had about the perpetrator. In many
states, conditions may cause a statute of limitations to be
“tolled,” or legally suspended such that it does not begin to run
until a proscribed time.
Child sex abuse SOLs are set by each state. For federal
offenses, SOLs are set by the federal government. An adult SOL
for child sex abuse is typically distinct from other child abuse or
rape statutes of limitation. At one time, in most states, child sex
abuse SOLs were triggered by the act of abuse itself, with the
victim accorded a set number of years from the date of the abuse
to bring the claim. For example, if a seven-year-old was raped by
her father, in one state she would have two years, until age nine,
to file charges or sue on civil claims. In another she might have
until age 19, a year past reaching majority. The idea historically
was that children “knew” they were being harmed during the
act. In that era, there were few studies about the dynamic of
abuse or its effects on the victims. Nor was there an adequate
appreciation of the special dangers inherent in situations where
one person has significantly more power over another. The vast
majority of states have now rejected these approaches.
Social science studies have shown that children in fact do
not fully understand (if they understand it at all) what sex is,
7 Marci A. Hamilton, What is a Statute of Limitations, SOL REFORM,
http://sol-reform.com/Pages/WhatIsSOL.php (last visited July 7, 2013).
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and certainly have no idea of the lifelong consequences of being
sexually assaulted. The aggressor always has power over them,
and, in the case of parents or guardians, it is a particularly
egregious power differential as the child is dependent on them
for providing life’s basic needs including shelter, food, and
clothing. Abusers commonly threaten the child to maintain the
silence. Where the abuser is a family member, the child is often
charged, consciously or subconsciously, with keeping the secret
to hold the family together. In the institutional setting, the adult
exercises power through the structure of the organization. Thus,
at Penn State, Coach Jerry Sandusky held power over the boys he
abused because he had the capacity to “make” their football
careers by getting them into Penn State; in religious institutions,
the priest or rabbi holds spiritual power that can be every bit as
compelling as the power of the parent; and in schools, teachers
have power over grades and advancement. The predators’
capacity to control the child is compounded by the fact that many
predators choose children who are in need and offer gifts, money,
and loving attention the child can get nowhere else.
All of these factors—failure to understand, powerlessness,
and a sadly contorted sense of obligation or responsibility—
contribute to victims’ incapacity to come forward. Hundreds of
studies have documented the psychological barriers to revealing
the abuse and have shown that, typically, a survivor needs
decades to process and understand the abuse. As a result, many
do not tell others about the abuse until their forties, fifties, or
even later. This dynamic has mobilized the movement to extend
and eliminate SOLs, and to revive them for survivors for whom
the SOL has expired.8
With 51 relevant jurisdictions in the United States, it can
be difficult to stay abreast of current developments, which is
why I created the website www.sol-reform.com. At this point, the
50 states and the District of Columbia are a patchwork of SOLs,
which can change as often as every year.9 A decided trend has
emerged from this proliferation of amendments to SOL
legislation in recent years, with all but one state liberalizing or
eliminating the SOLs.10 Delaware completely eliminated the
8 Marci A. Hamilton, The Year in Review: 2012 Marks the Highest
Watermark Yet for Victims of Child Sex Abuse, JUSTIA (Dec. 13, 2012),
http://verdict.justia.com/2012/12/13/the-year-in-review.
9 My website, www.sol-reform.com, tracks the limits in each state and the
federal government.
10 Only South Dakota has shortened child sex abuse SOLs, when it retracted
the SOL in the face of lawsuits filed by Native American victims against Roman
Catholic priests. Marci A. Hamilton, A Tale of Two States and Three Survivors: The Legal
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civil and criminal SOLs on claims of child sex abuse prospectively,
and has enacted two windows for purposes of permitting victims
to sue for damages even though their SOL already expired.11
Other states, including Florida, have also eliminated some SOLs
prospectively,12 but have not taken action to create opportunities
for survivors whose SOLs have expired.
At another end of the spectrum is New York, for example,
which forecloses most criminal charges unless victims press
charges by the age of 23; and forecloses civil claims after the
victims reaches age 28. However, even New York has eliminated
an SOL for felonious acts of child sex abuse.13 In general, many
states have successfully relaxed their child sex abuse SOLs over
the last two decades and many place the issue on their legislative
agendas on a regular basis.14
B.

Criminal v. Civil Statutes of Limitation
1. Generally

There is a critical difference between criminal and civil
statutes of limitation. While criminal SOLs cannot be applied
retroactively,15 the Supreme Court has ruled that civil SOLs are
merely a legislative convenience, enacted by the grace of the
various legislatures, which may be changed should the legislature
see fit.16 Thus, a civil SOL may be extended retroactively for
victims whose SOLs have already expired. Some states have
enacted “windows,” which make it possible for survivors to file
civil claims even if their SOL has expired, within a given period of
time. For example, Delaware enacted a two-year window. In
Obstacles Relating to Syracuse University’s Sex Abuse Scandal, JUSTIA (Dec. 1, 2011),
http://verdict.justia.com/2011/12/01/a-tale-of-two-states-and-three-survivors;
Stephanie
Woodard, South Dakota Quashes New Childhood Sexual Abuse Bill, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 9, 2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/article/
south-dakota-legislature-quashes-new-childhood-sexual-abuse-bill-96429.
11 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8145(a)–(b) (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 205(e) (2013); H.R. 326, 145th Gen. Assemb., (Del. 2010).
12 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 95.11(9), 775.15(1) & (14) (West 2013).
13 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(3)(f) & (2)(a) (McKinney 2013).
14 See Marci A. Hamilton, Summary of Statutes of Limitations Reform Across
the United States, SOL REFORM (June 28, 2013), http://sol-reform.com/SNAPSHOT_
OF_SOL_STATUTES_AND_2013_PENDING_BILLS_ACROSS_THE_US.pdf. It is my
view that eventually the SOLs for child sex abuse will be eliminated in every state. The
primary barrier is political, as opposed to principle; see also http://sol-reform.com/News/
january-9-2014-marci-a-hamilton-2013-the-year-in-review-for-child-sex-abuse-victimsaccess-to-justice/.
15 See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003).
16 Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
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Sheehan v. Oblates of St. Francis De Sales,17 the Supreme Court
of Delaware upheld Delaware’s civil window legislation. The
Court held that application of a law that repeals the SOL on
child sex-related abuse and permits a two-year window for
victims to file civil suits on previously barred actions and
revive gross negligence claims against institutional defendants
that employed or controlled an alleged abuser did not violate
federal or state due process.18
Because civil SOLs may be changed at the will of the
legislature, it is constitutional for a legislature to allow victims who
have run out of time under an SOL to later bring a suit. Some
states have even passed “Window Legislation,” which “essentially
opens a specified duration [of time] in which civil claims that would
have been barred [by the SOL] can be brought.”19 Windows were
not invented for child sex abuse cases. The idea was initially tested
to address mass torts for, for example, chemical or asbestos
exposure, in Delaware, New York, Minnesota, and California.20
However, California,21 Delaware,22 Hawaii,23 Minnesota,24 and
Guam25 have now all enacted window legislation, and similar
legislation is pending in Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
and Pennsylvania. Delaware, in response to a realization that, due
to a technicality, its first window did not cover healthcare workers,
enacted an additional window to provide access to justice for
children abused in a healthcare setting.26

15 A.3d 1247, 1248 (Del. 2011).
Id.
19 Marci A. Hamilton, What is a SOL? SOL REFORM, http://sol-reform.com/
Pages/WhatIsSOL.php#window (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
20 Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace & Co., 752 F. Supp. 286 (D. Minn.
1990); 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611, 633 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 811-12 (E.D.N.Y.
1984); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of America, Inc., 534 A.2d 272, 276-77 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1987); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1079-80 (N.Y. 1989).
21 Melanie H. v. Defendant Doe, No. 04-CV-1596-WQH-(WMC), at 25 (S.D.
Cal. Dec. 21, 2005); Deutsch v. Masonic Homes of California, Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 368,
378-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); see also Marci A. Hamilton, Here is What is Happening in
California, SOL REFORM, http://sol-reform.com/California/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
22 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8145(a)–(b) (2013); see also Marci A. Hamilton,
Here is What is Happening in Delaware, SOL REFORM, http://sol-reform.com/Delaware/.
23 S.B. 2588, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2012); see also Marci A. Hamilton, Here
is What is Happening in Hawaii, SOL REFORM, http://sol-reform.com/Hawaii/ (last visited
Oct. 7, 2013).
24 2011 Minn. Laws. ch. 190 § 541.073(2); Gomon v. Northland Family
Physicians, Ltd., 645 N.W.2d 413, 414, 418-20 (Minn. 2002); K.E. v. Hoffman, 452
N.W.2d 509, 512-14 (Minn. App. 1990).
25 B. No. 34, 31st Leg. (Guam 2011); see also Marci A. Hamilton, Here is What is
Happening in Guam, SOL REFORM, http://sol-reform.com/Guam/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
26 18 DEL. CODE tit. 18, § 6856(3)(b) (2010).
17
18
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Windows are only constitutional on the civil side of the
law. On the other hand, once a criminal SOL runs out, a guilty
perpetrator or institution cannot be criminally charged. The
United States Supreme Court, in Stogner v. California,27 held the
California window on the criminal side unconstitutional as it
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.28 Thus, when a criminal SOL
expires, there is no possibility of reviving it. The only means of
revival is through civil lawsuits for damages.
2. Criminal Statutes of Limitation
A criminal SOL is the maximum amount of time during
which a prosecutor may bring charges after the time of injury
occurs.29 The criminal SOL, like the civil SOL, may be set to begin
running at different times. There is a growing trend among states
to increase or eliminate the SOL for crimes related to child sexual
assault.30 In the past year, Arkansas31 and Illinois32 eliminated
their criminal SOLs. Some states do not require an SOL for firstdegree child sex abuse offenses but do impose a limitation period on
felony and misdemeanor sex crimes against minors.33
In cases with minors, in all but one state, the statutes of
limitations are tolled until the age of majority, which is typically
18.34 This means that the SOL does not begin to run until a
proscribed time that is most often when the victim turns 18 and is
no longer considered a minor. Thus, a tolled criminal SOL might
be eight years after the moment a victim turns 18-years-old.35

539 U.S. 607, 609 (2003).
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl.1.
29 Jenna Miller, Note, The Constitutionality of and Need for Retroactive Civil
Legislation Relating to Child Sexual Abuse, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 599, 600 (2011).
30 Id. at 625.
31 S.B. 92, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 89th Gen. Assem. (Ark. 2013) (enacted) (eliminating
limitation of time for bringing a criminal action with respect to child sex abuse).
32 H.B. 1063, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013) (passed but pending
governor’s signature).
33 For example, New York has no limitations period for first-degree criminal
offenses. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(2)(a) (McKinney 2013). However, there is a
five-year limitations period for all other felony sex offenses, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 30.10(2)(b) (McKinney 2013), and a two-year limitations period for misdemeanor sex
offenses. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(2)(c) (McKinney 2013).
34 See generally SOL REFORM, www.sol-reform.com.
35 In California, under current law, the SOL is tolled 8 years, until the victim
reaches 26, or for 3 years after the date “the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should
have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority
was caused by the sexual abuse.” (with certificate of merit only). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 340.1(a)–(h) (West 2013).
27
28
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However, when a legislative body decides to increase or
remove an SOL, it cannot apply the changes retroactively.36 Thus
any new criminal statutes of limitation laws are applied only to
incidents after the date the law is effective. Once a statute of
limitations runs out, even a guilty perpetrator cannot be
criminally charged.
3. Civil Statutes of Limitation
A civil SOL does not begin to run until a claim “accrues,”
and accrual varies from state to state and depending upon the
type of harm.37 In the context of child sexual abuse, in those states
which follow the discovery rule, accrual does not occur until a
victim “discovers” any injuries,38 or the causal connection to those
injuries. It is widely accepted that the victims of child sexual
assault do not discover the extent of their injuries until much
later in life, after the actual abuse.39 In some states, there is a
special rule for cases of repressed memory.40
Legislation that eliminates the civil SOL or includes a
discovery rule is supported by various studies on the long-term
effects of child molestation and the likely delay in disclosure.
Researchers in various studies have found—specifically in men
who were sexually abused as children—that long-term
adaptation will often include sexual problems, dysfunctions or
compulsions, confusion and struggles over gender and sexual
identity, homophobia and confusion about sexual orientation,
problems with intimacy, shame, guilt and self-blame, low selfesteem, negative self–images, increased anger, and conflicts with
authority figures.41 There is also an increased rate of substance
abuse, a tendency to deny and delegitimize the traumatic
experience, symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and
increased probability of fear and depression for all victims.42
Often, it is not until years after the sexual abuse that victims

36 See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) (holding that the retroactive
application of the California law violated ex post facto law).
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 (1979).
38 Marci A. Hamilton, What is a Statute of Limitations?, SOL REFORM,
http://sol-reform.com/Pages/WhatIsSOL.php (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
39 Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 (1983).
40 See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5107(e)(6)(D) (West 2013); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 205(e) (2013).
41 Major Findings, Adverse Childhood Experiences Study, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/ace/findings.htm.
42 Id.
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experience these negative outcomes.43 As clinician Mic Hunter has
observed: “Some of the effects of sexual abuse do not become
apparent until the victim is an adult and a major life event,
such as marriage or birth of a child, takes place. Therefore, a
child who seemed unharmed by childhood abuse can develop
crippling symptoms years later . . . .”44
The lawsuits filed under window legislation have led to the
public identification of previously unknown child predators, which
reduces the odds that children will be abused in the future.45 For
example, the 2003 window in California led to the public
identification of over 300 previously unidentified perpetrators.46
Delaware’s window has led to the public identification of dozens of
previously hidden perpetrators. Hawaii’s currently open window
has identified Jay Ram, who allegedly used the foster care system
to obtain boys, adopt them, and sexually abuse them while
neglecting their needs,47 while Minnesota’s open window has
triggered a waterfall of disclosures that never would have
happened without the window.48
In civil suits, window legislation affording retroactive
application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, even if the
court applies the criminal code active during the alleged assault,
and not the code in existence at the time of trial.49 While some
courts differ on this issue, the majority of states do not find
retroactive civil SOLs unconstitutional.50
43 What are the Effects of Child Sexual Abuse?, Understanding Child Sexual
Abuse: Education, Prevention, and Recovery, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N,
http://www.apa.org/pubs/info/brochures/sex-abuse.aspx?item=4 (last visited Sept. 25,
2013); see also R.L. v. Voytac, 971 A.2d 1074, 1084 (N.J. 2009) (quoting Jones v. Jones,
576 A.2d 316, 321 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)) (“[L]ong after the cycle of abuse
itself has been broken, the victim will repress and deny, even to himself or herself,
what has happened.”).
44 MIC HUNTER, ABUSED BOYS: THE NEGLECTED VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ABUSE
59 (1990) (explaining that at the time the child is sexually abused he or she is often too
young to appreciate the harmful nature of the acts).
45 Jeffrey Pruzan, Note, Abuse, Mediation and the Catholic Church: How
Enforcing and Improving Existing Statutes Will Help Victims Recover, 13 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 593, 605 (2012).
46 Marci A. Hamilton, The Maturing of a Movement: Statute of Limitations
Reform for Sex Abuse Victims, FINDLAW (June 11, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
hamilton/20090611.html.
47 Former Big Island Farmer Accused of Abusing Child, HAW. NEWS NOW
(Mar. 4, 2013, 4:11 PM). http://sol-reform.com/Hawaii/Hawaii-window-creates-justicefor-survivor-of-abuse-by-adoptive-father.pdf.
48 Marci A. Hamilton, News: Post MN Window SOL REFORM, http://solreform.com/News/topics/mn-post-window/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
49 Sheehan v. Oblates of St. Francis de Sales, 15 A.3d 1247, 1258 (Del. 2011).
50 Compare Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska v. Does, 141 P.3d 719, 725 (Alaska
2006), Riggs Nat’l Bank v. Dist. of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229 (D.C. 1990), and Neiman v.
Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 613 N.W.2d 160, 161 (Wis. 2000) (holding that retroactive
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4. Trends in Statutes of Limitation Reform
The pace of SOL reform has increased markedly over
the last several years. In 2013 alone, SOL reform was enacted
in Arkansas, where the state eliminated the criminal SOL;51
Illinois, where the civil and criminal SOLs were eliminated;52
Vermont, where the SOL was increased for certain sex crimes
against children;53 Nevada, where the criminal statute of
limitations was extended;54 and Minnesota, where a window was
enacted.55 Bills were introduced for at least the second time in
Pennsylvania (window; civil and criminal elimination);56 New
Jersey (window and extension of discovery rule);57 and

application of statutes of limitation is unconstitutional), with San Carlos Apache Tribe
v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 192-93 (Ariz. 1999),
superseded by statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-505 (2010), Liebig v. Superior Court,
257 Cal. Rptr. 574 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 1989), Mudd v. McColgan, 183 P.2d 10, 13 (Cal.
1947), Rossi v. Osage Highland Dev., LLC, 219 P.3d 319, 322 (Colo. App. 2009) (citing
In re Estate of Randall, 441 P.2d 153, 155 (Colo. 1968)), Shell Western E&P, Inc. v.
Dolores County Bd. of Comm’rs, 948 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Colo. 1997) (en banc), Roberts v.
Caton, 619 A.2d 844 (Conn. 1993), Whitwell v. Archmere Acad., Inc., C.A. No: 07C-08006 (RBY), 2008 Del. Super. LEXIS 141 at *3, 7-8 (Del. Super. Ct. April 16, 2008),
Vaughn v. Vulcan Materials Co., 465 S.E.2d 661 (Ga. 1996), Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v.
Hyman, 975 P.2d 211 (Haw. 1999), Roe v. Doe, 581 P.2d 310, 314 (Haw. 1978),
Henderson v. Smith, 915 P.2d 6, 10 (Idaho 1996), Hecla Mining Co. v. Idaho State Tax
Comm’n, 697 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Idaho 1985), Metro Holding Co. v. Mitchell, 589 N.E.2d
217, 219 (Ind. 1992), Ripley v. Tolbert, 921 P.2d 1210, 1224 (Kan. 1996), Shirley v. Reif,
920 P.2d 405, 411-12 (Kan. 1996), Kienzler v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 686
N.E.2d 447, 451 (Mass. 1997), Rookledge v. Garwood, 65 N.W.2d 785, 791 (Mich. 1954),
Gomon v. Northland Family Physicians, Ltd., 645 N.W.2d 413, 419-20 (Minn. 2002),
Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe, 864 P.2d 776, 778 (Mont. 1993), Panzino v. Cont’l Can Co., 364 A.2d
1043, 1045-46 (N.J. 1976), Bunton v. Abernathy, 73 P.2d 810, 811-12 (N.M. 1937),
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1079 (N.Y. 1989), In Interest of W.M.V., 268
N.W.2d 781, 786 (N.D. 1978), Pratte v. Stewart, 929 N.E.2d 415, 422 (Ohio 2010),
McFadden v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 112 P.3d 1191, 1195 (Or. 2005), McDonald v. Redevelopment
Auth., 952 A.2d 713, 717-18 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008), Bible v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 696
A.2d 1149, 1156 (Pa. 1997), Stratmeyer v. Stratmeyer, 567 N.W.2d 220, 224 (S.D. 1997),
Ballard Square Condo. Owners Ass’n v. Dynasty Constr. Co., 146 P.3d 914, 923 (Wash.
2006) (en banc) superseded by statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.303 (2013), as
recognized in Chadwick Farms Owners Ass’n v. FHC, LLC, 207 P.3d 1251, 1260 (Wash.
2009) (en banc), RM v. State Dep’t of Family Servs., Div. of Public Servs., 891 P.2d 791,
792 (Wyo. 1995) (all holding that retroactive application of statutes of limitation is not
unconstitutional), and Alsenz v. Twin Lakes Village, Inc., 843 P.2d 834, 837-38 (Nev. 1992)
(open question).
51 S.B. 92, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 89th Gen. Assem. (Ark. 2013) (enacted).
52 H.B. 1063, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013); S.B. 1399, 98th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013).
53 S.B. 20, 2013, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2013) (enacted).
54 S.B. 103, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2013).
55 H.B. 681, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2013) (enacted).
56 H.B. 237, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013); H.B. 238, 2013 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013).
57 S.B. 2281, 215th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2012).
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Massachusetts (civil extension to age 55 with a window).58 They
were also introduced in New York (window; civil and criminal
elimination);59 Missouri (elimination of civil and criminal);60
Oregon (elimination criminal for certain sex crimes against
minors);61 Washington (extension of criminal to 30);62 and
Wisconsin (elimination of civil with a window).63 The California
legislature passed a second window to capture those survivors
who did not file under the window that was in effect in 2003; it
was vetoed by Governor Jerry Brown.64
II.

MANDATORY REPORTING AND REPORTERS

A.

Mandatory Reporters—Specified

Mandatory reporting laws are essential in the pursuit of
justice, as child sex abuse victims are often unable to report the
abuse themselves. Every state has mandatory reporting laws
that require specified individuals who suspect that a child has
been or is being sexually abused to report the incident. Although
mandatory reporting rules vary by state, 48 states currently have
mandatory reporting laws that specify professionals who are
subject to the legislation.65 Two states have general reporting
mandates.66 Specified mandated reporters include teachers,
nurses, physicians, other healthcare providers, social service
employees, mental health professionals, law enforcement, and
others in professional child care.67 Some states also include
individuals who work in film or photography processing, drug
abuse counselors, staff at camps and recreation centers, domestic
58 H.B. 1455, 188th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013); S.B. 633, 188th Gen.
Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013).
59 Assemb. A01771, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).
60 H.B. 247, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013).
61 H.B. 3284, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013).
62 S.B. 5100, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013).
63 S.B. 225, 101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2013).
64 S.B. 131, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). It was vetoed by Governor Jerry
Brown. Letter from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor of California, to Members of the
California State Senate (Oct. 12, 2013), available at http://sol-reform.com/News/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/SB_131_2013_Veto_Message.pdf; Marci A. Hamilton, Gov.
Jerry Brown’s Recent Veto of Child Abuse Legislation and What It Tells Us About the
Civil Rights Movement for Children, JUSTIA (Oct. 17, 2013), http://verdict.justia.com/
2013/10/17/gov-jerry-browns-recent-veto-child-abuse-legislation-tells-us-civil-rightsmovement-children.
65 Mandatory
Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect, CHILD WELFARE
INFORMATION
GATEWAY
(Aug.
2012),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/
laws_policies/statutes/manda.pdf.
66 New Jersey and Wyoming. Id. at 2.
67 Id.
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violence workers, court-appointed guardians, and members of the
clergy.68 Upon suspecting, observing, or having reason to believe
that a child is being sexually abused, mandated reporters are
responsible for calling and reporting the abuse to a hotline.69
If it is discovered that a mandated reporter knew or
should have known of sexual abuse of a child and failed to report
it, he or she is subject to prosecution by the state.70 The reporter
who fails to fulfill his obligation can also be subjected to fines.71
Generally there must be a concrete, reportable incident
for the mandatory report to be triggered.72 Otherwise, the
failure of the reporter to inform the state of the abuse will not
result in criminal or civil liability.73 Reporters are usually kept
anonymous, but this protection may be waived if it is
determined that the caller knowingly and intentionally made a
fraudulent report.74 The reporter may also voluntarily waive
the protection and have his or her identity disclosed.75
After a number of child sex abuse scandals were
uncovered and publicized, there was an increase in new
legislation aimed at expanding the scope of mandatory reporting
laws. Arkansas, Washington D.C., Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Louisiana, Oregon, South Dakota, West Virginia, Virginia, and
Washington all passed new laws that expand the list of
mandatory reporters to include individuals who work in
institutions of secondary and higher education.76 Some of these
laws also specifically include athletic personnel, who are generally
considered outside the scope of educational professionals such as

Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
70 See Penalties for Failure to Report and False Reporting of Child Abuse and
Neglect, CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY (Aug. 2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/
systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/report.pdf.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Summary Guide for Mandated Reporters in New York State, NEW YORK
STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES (Sept. 2012), http://ocfs.ny.gov/main/
publications/Pub1159.pdf.
74 Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 65, at 5.
75 Id.
76 Ana
M. Valdes, Sex Abuse Reporting Requirements Taking Effect
Nationwide, in Wake of Sandusky Case, WPTV (June 30, 2012), http://www.wptv.com/dpp/
news/sex-abuse-reporting-requirements-taking-effect-nationwide-in-wake-of-sanduskycase; Mandatory Reporting of Child Abuse and Neglect: 2013 Introduced Legislation,
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 5, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/human-services/mandatory-rprtg-of-child-abuse-and-neglect-2013.aspx.; see also
Illinois Aims to Head Off Sex Abuse Scandals Like at Penn State, REUTERS (June 27,
2012, 11:57 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/27/us-usa-illinois-law-abuseidUSBRE85Q14S20120627.
68
69
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teachers.77 Many additional states also attempted to pass widerreaching mandatory reporting laws, which were stalled in their
state legislatures.78
B.

Mandatory Reporting—General/Unspecified

New Jersey and Wyoming are the only two states in the
U.S. that have general mandatory reporting laws as opposed to
specified professionals who are subject to the requirements.79
General mandatory reporting laws require anyone who suspects
or has reason to believe that the sexual abuse of a child is
occurring to report the incident to a state agency. Mandatory
reporting can also be based on actual knowledge or observation of
abuse.80 Like specified mandatory reporting, general mandatory
reporter laws implement fines and criminal punishments for
failure to report when it is uncovered that someone had reasonable
cause to believe that abuse was occurring and did not report it.
Aside from New Jersey and Wyoming, a number of other
states have additional provisions beyond the specified mandatory
reporters that require any person who knows, suspects, or has
reason to believe that child sexual abuse is occurring to report
that abuse to a hotline.81 Furthermore, while the focus of this
section is mandatory reporters, all states allow anyone who
knows, suspects, or has reason to believe that there is child sexual
abuse occurring to report the incident. This is known as
permissive reporting.82
C.

Confessional Exemption

Most states allow for exceptions to reporting
requirements for members of the clergy if the suspicion of
abuse is based on a statement made in confession. Currently,
only Connecticut, Mississippi, and New Jersey do not address the
confessional exemption in their mandatory reporting laws.83 New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas,
West Virginia, and Guam explicitly reject the confessional
exemption from mandatory reporting laws; clergy members may
Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 65, at 3.
Mandatory Reporting of Child Abuse and Neglect: 2013 Introduced
Legislation, supra note 76.
79 Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 65, at 2 n.1.
80 Id. at 3.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 4 n.9.
77
78
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not claim that a statement related to child sex abuse was
privileged as an excuse for failing to fulfill their obligations
under mandatory reporting laws.84
Confessional exemptions cover all religions in the sense
that if a believer converses with a religious leader and
confesses to child sex abuse, that exchange might be privileged
and the religious leader not subject to the mandatory reporting
laws. Many religious institutions invoke these exemptions to
justify the failure to report suspected child sex abuse occurring
within their congregations. The breadth of the exemption varies
from state to state. In some jurisdictions, the confessional
exemption has been limited to statements made in seeking
spiritual advice.85 It is not enough that the statement was made
to a religious leader; the statement must be made in confidence
while seeking spiritual advice. In other jurisdictions, the
exemption is interpreted more broadly.
Once a believer has waived the privilege, such as
through voluntary admission to a non-clergy member or in a
deposition or other pre-trial discovery, the exemption no longer
applies.86 So long as the believer knew when he voluntarily
Id. at 4 n.10.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505(b) (West 2013). (“A communication between a
member of the clergy and a person is ‘confidential’ if made privately for the purpose of
seeking spiritual counsel and advice from the member of the clergy in the usual course
of his or her practice or discipline and not intended for further disclosure except to
other persons present in furtherance of the communication.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-75(g) (West 2013). (“[C]lergy shall not be required to report child abuse reported solely
within the context of confession or other similar communication required to be kept
confidential under church doctrine or practice.”).
86 Monroe v. State, 14 So. 3d 1205, 1207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (finding
testimony by minister as to confession defendant-confessor made to minister was
admissible because defendant knew when defendant voluntarily made disclosure that
it would not be held confidential by minister and would be subject to disclosure to
police under Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 90.505(1)(b) and 90.507); Lifemark Hosp. of Fla., Inc. v.
Hernandez, 748 So. 2d 378, 379-80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (finding waiver of privilege
where plaintiff previously provided psychologist’s records to plaintiff ’ s expert); Herron v. E.
Indus., No. 5:07cv35/RH/EMT, 74 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 824, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 69339, *17 n.2 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2007) (noting that privilege may be waived via
disclosures made in court documents under § 90.507, Fla. Stat. which provides that a
“person who has a privilege against the disclosure of a confidential matter or communication
waives the privilege if the person . . . voluntarily discloses or makes the communication
when . . . she does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy”); Doe v. Mann, No. 6:05-cv259-Orl-31DAB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65769, *3 n.1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2006) (“Under
Florida law . . . privilege can be waived [if] the holder of the privilege . . . ‘voluntarily
discloses or makes the communication when he does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication.’”);
State v. Gray, 2004-1197 (La. , Jan. 19, 2005), 891 So. 2d 1260, 1265 (Clergymen privilege
waived if information disclosed to third parties); Perry v. State, 280 Ark. 36, 37 (1983) (“We
agree with the trial court that Perry told about everyone he could about killing his wife and,
therefore, waived any privilege he might claim.”); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Super. Ct. In & For Maricopa Cnty., 764 P.2d 759, 764 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)
84
85
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disclosed the previously privileged statement that it was no
longer confidential, it is unprotected in all future litigation. If
the believer no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the communication, the privilege has ceased.87 Once the
privilege is lost, typically a clergy member cannot claim
confessional exemption under the mandatory reporter laws.88
The clergy member cannot claim that he has a right to keep the
information confidential because the privileged nature of the
statement really belongs to the believer and not the clergy
member or his institution.89 Further, once the privilege has
been waived it cannot be reinstated.90
Every state has made strides in increasing the protection
to children through mandatory reporting laws, whether it be
through specified or general reporting obligations, and through
the permissive legislation.91 While some states have also provided
for a confessional exemption, the breadth and scope of that
exemption varies. Courts should remain cognizant that once a
believer waives the confidential nature of the confession, the
exemption no longer applies and the statement may be used in
subsequent litigation.92

(“We hold that the clergyman/penitent privilege, like other privileges, is susceptible to
implied waiver through conduct inconsistent with the maintenance of conversational
privacy . . . .”).
87 Ray v. Cutter Labs., Div. of Miles, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 86, 88 (M.D. Fla.
1990) (holding that a disclosure of information eliminates the expectation of privacy,
and waives the privilege); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 114 F. Supp. 2d
1054, 1055 (D. Or. 2000) (psychotherapist compelled to testify where defendant waived
privilege by using psychologist’s diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder during
prior hearing); Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 228 (D. Mass. 1997).
88 R.K. v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Latter Day Saints, No. C042338RSM, 2006 WL2661059 at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 14, 2006) (holding that when the
clergy-penitent privilege does not apply, the clergy member does not have a legal right
to not comply with mandatory reporting laws, and therefore had a duty to report).
89 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505(2) (“A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose,
and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication by the person to
a member of the clergy in his or her capacity as spiritual adviser.”).
90 In Florida, “[i]t is black letter law that once the privilege is waived, and the
horse out of the barn, it cannot be reinvoked.” Hamilton v. Hamilton Steel Corp., 409
So. 2d 1111, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing FLA. STAT. § 90.507 and 5
ERHARDT’S FLORIDA PRACTICE, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 507.1 (1977)); Cutter Labs., 746 F.
Supp. at 88 (quoting Hamilton, 409 So. 2d at 1114); Doe v. Mann, No. 6:05-cv-259-Orl31DAB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65769, *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2006) (“Once a
confidential communications, or a diagnosis based thereon, becomes disclosed at the
privilege-holder’s request, the basis for the privilege departs and cannot be
recaptured . . . .”).
91 Supra notes 68-85.
92 Supra note 90.
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INSTITUTION-BASED ABUSE

After the unveiling of numerous institutions hiding abuse,
plaintiffs have filed suits under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, federal conspiracy statutes,
civil and criminal fraud theories, and state tort theories, including
the doctrine of respondeat superior and negligence theories.
A.

Criminal RICO and Conspiracy to Commit Sexual
Abuse Crimes

The RICO and federal conspiracy statutes provide newer
avenues for plaintiffs to file suits. While both these theories allow
for plaintiffs to hold institutions accountable for patterns of
conduct that allowed abuse to occur for continued periods of time,
the two differ in the elements that satisfy the claims and the
penalties that result from conviction.
1. Background: Federal Prosecution of Sexual Abuse
Crimes
Sexual abuse crimes are prosecuted in the federal system
under The Sexual Abuse Act of 1986.93 The age of the victim and
whether force was used are two important facts that help
determine the appropriate statute and punishment.94 Section
2247 increases the maximum penalties for repeat offenders, and
Section 2248 mandates restitution to the victims.95
According to the United States Attorneys’ Manual,
when investigating crimes involving child pornography, child
sexual abuse, child sexual exploitation and obscenity:
CEOS [Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section] and USAOs
[United States Attorney Offices] will work together to ensure that
[such] crimes . . . are vigorously enforced throughout the nation.
Generally, such crimes are prosecuted by the USAO in the relevant
district. However, CEOS attorneys have substantial experience in
prosecuting these types of crimes and they are available to assist in
the investigative stage and/or to handle trials as chair or co-chair.96

18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–48.
18 U.S.C §§ 2241(a), (c) (2012).
95 Id. §§ 2247(a), 2248.
96 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-75.030
(2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/
75mcrm.htm#9-75.030.
93
94
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RICO defines the sexual abuse of a minor in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2243.97 Section 2243 delineates two offenses involving a “sexual
act,” as defined in Section 2246(2).98 Subsection (a) makes it an
offense, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States or a Federal prison, for a person to engage in, or
attempt to engage in, a sexual act with someone who is (1) at
least 12 but less than 16 years old and (2) at least four years
younger than that person. The maximum punishment is 15 years
imprisonment and/or a fine under Title 18.99
This sexual abuse offense does not require the use of force
or threats, or the administering of a drug, intoxicant, or other
similar substance. It applies to behavior that the participants
voluntarily and willingly engage in. The offense is intended to
reach older, mature persons who take advantage of younger,
immature persons, but not to reach sexual activity between
persons of comparable age. Corroboration of the victim’s
testimony is not required. Because subsection (a) reaches noncoercive conduct, and because some states permit marriage by
persons of less than 16 years of age, subsection (c)(2) sets forth a
defense that the parties were married at the time of the sexual
act.100 The defendant has the burden of establishing this defense
by a preponderance of the evidence.101
There are different provisions of RICO that apply to wards
of the United States. Subsection (b) of Section 2243 also makes it
an offense for a person to engage in a sexual act with someone (1)
who is in official detention, and (2) who is under the custodial,
supervisory, or disciplinary authority of the defendant.102 The
maximum punishment is one year’s imprisonment and/or a fine
under Title 18. Here too, corroboration of the victim’s testimony is
not required.
2. Criminal RICO v. Conspiracy
The federal RICO statute provides for prosecution based
upon patterns of criminal behavior, and conspiracy to commit
criminal behavior as a part of a larger criminal endeavor.103 RICO
creates a cause of action in both state and federal courts.104 Sexual
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012).
Id. §§ 2243, 2246(2).
Id. § 2243(a).
Id. § 2243(c)(2).
Id.
Id. § 2243(b).
Id. §§ 1961-68.
Id. § 1965.
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abuse crimes under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241 through 2248, including
sexual abuse of a minor, are predicate crimes that may trigger
RICO prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968.105 Thus, if an
organization engages in any two of 35 predicate crimes within a
10-year period, it may be charged with racketeering. In Ohio, two
bishops were charged under RICO, but a grand jury failed to find
their mishandling of child sex abuse claims to constitute criminal
racketeering.106 In addition, CEOS and the USAO have discretion
as to whether a prosecution will take place under RICO.107
The maximum penalty for a RICO violation is up to 20
years in prison.108 Further, RICO prosecutions are not limited
to organizations of crime, like the mafia.109 For example, while
labor unions are not in the primary business of crime, they may
still face RICO prosecutions.110 Thus, religious or other private
organizations could be subject to the RICO statute.111
In contrast to RICO, where particular categories of crimes
must satisfy the requirements for prosecution, conspiracy under
federal law may be triggered by the committing of any offense
against United States law or the defrauding of the United States.
So long as two or more persons conspire to commit crimes against
the United States, they may be subject to prosecution.112
105 Id. §§ 1961-68 (2012); Hall v. Tressic, 381 F. Supp. 2d 101, 106-08
(N.D.N.Y. 2005).
106 James F. McCarthy, The Cost of Abuse: 7 Indicted in Diocesan Sex Cases,
CLEVELAND (Dec. 5, 2002), http://www.cleveland.com/abuse/index.ssf?/abuse/more/
103908428283790.html.
107 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 96, at 9-75.030.
108 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2012).
109 Pruzan, supra note 45, at 613-14.
110 Id.
111 Davis Lee Pharmacy, Inc., v. Manhattan Central Capital Corp., 327 F.
Supp. 2d 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (The plaintiff commenced a federal action against
business associates and their business, minister and church elders for alleged RICO
violations involving consumer fraud). United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765 (3d Cir.
1982) (The court upheld a conviction under RICO based on the government’s allegation
that defendant’s robberies were committed to finance defendants’ religious Black
Muslim organization. The court noted that while the First Amendment prohibits
governmental interference with religious beliefs, it does not protect practices which
imperil public safety, peace or order from government scrutiny.) Hall v. Tressic, 318 F.
Supp. 2d 101 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) A student brought sued a church, alleging that it had
violated RICO by covering up sex abuse by a local priest. However the student failed to
demonstrate that the acts constituted a pattern of racketeering activity to sustain a
RICO claim.
112 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (“If two or more persons conspire either to commit
any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act
to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.”); see also United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218,
1228 (11th Cir. 2012) (defendants convicted of conspiring to advertise, transport/ship,
receive, and possess child pornography, and to obstruct an official proceeding, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371); United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2009)
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As compared to RICO claims, general conspiracy charges
also threaten lesser sentences. Whereas the penalty for RICO
prosecution is up to 15 years in prison,113 a conspiracy regarding a
criminal sex abuse crime only carries with it misdemeanor
penalties, and the punishment for such conspiracy shall not
exceed the maximum punishment provided for the
misdemeanor.114 Furthermore, conspiracy prosecutions generally
must begin within three to five years of the last overt act.115
However, for RICO prosecutions, where there may not be proof of
an overt act, the conspiracy only must be proved to have
continued into the limitations period. Many of the principles
described above also apply to state RICO laws and state
conspiracy laws.
B.

Institutional Liability for the Abuse of Children

Institutions may be found liable for the abuse of
children on the basis of vicarious liability or fraud. While sex
abuse has been found to fall outside the scope of employment,
juries have more recently been inclined to hold employers liable
for the sex abuse acts by their employees. Liability based on
fraud requires showing a misrepresentation or concealment of
a material fact, but an institution could be criminally
prosecuted for a cover-up if it violates a federal statute.
1. Civil Tort Liability of Employers for Employees
and/or Volunteers
Under respondeat superior, an employer will be found
liable for civil child sex abuse torts committed by an employee,
provided that (1) the abuse was committed within the time and
space limitations of the agency relationship, (2) the employee
was at least partially motivated by a purpose to serve the
employer, and (3) the act was of a kind that the employee was
hired to perform.116 This type of vicarious liability attaches to
(Defendants convicted for conspiring to transport minors in interstate commerce with
the intent of having the minors engage in illegal sexual activity).
113 18 U.S.C. § 371
114 Id.
115 Id. § 3282; see also Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957);
United States v. Hitt, 249 F.3d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
116 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 70,
at 502 (5th ed. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(1) (2006) (“An
employer is subject to vicarious liability for a tort committed by its employee acting
within the scope of employment.”).
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an employer whether or not the employer is negligent or has
direct control over the employee.117 It is distinguished from
simple “but-for” causation (that the abuse would not have been
committed but for the employment). In many jurisdictions, the
abuse must have been a generally foreseeable consequence of
the activity engaged in on behalf of the employer, such that the
employer would not be shocked or startled by being held to
account for the action.118
Some courts have found that in the context of child sex
abuse cases, the act of wrongdoing is so severe that it cannot be
considered within the scope of employment.119 Without
satisfaction of that requirement, respondeat superior liability
cannot survive. However, the question of whether an act of
sexual abuse can be within the scope of employment is most
often a question of fact for the jury to decide, and the trend is
toward finding employers liable for an employee’s sexual abuse
of minors.120 In addition, while religious institutions have often
raised First Amendment defenses to such liability, as discussed
in Section VII.B. of this article, most states refused to recognize
this defense against neutral, generally applicable criminal or
civil tort laws, such as negligence.
The doctrine does not turn on payment to employees or
other subordinates. These considerations do not alter the
responsibilities of principal or agent, so even volunteers can
trigger liability on behalf of the organization for the torts they
themselves commit.121 However, independent contractors, who
are not under as much control or supervision as employers or
certain volunteers, do not confer liability on behalf of the
superior organization.122 Employers are also liable for their own
negligent acts putting children at risk. A failure to institute or
follow child protection policies triggers liability. Placing a

KEETON ET AL., supra note 116, at 501-02.
Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1082 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Fearing v.
Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Or. 1999)); Cordts v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 252 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 633 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Minnis v. Or. Mut. Ins. Co., 48 P.3d 137, 14445 (Or. 2002).
119 Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66, 71 (D. Conn. 1995).
120 Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d at 1082; Hardwicke v. American Boychoir Sch.,
902 A.2d 900, 920 (N.J. 2006); Jane Doe 130 v. Archdiocese of Portland in Or., 717 F.
Supp. 2d 1120, 1137 (D. Or. 2010).
121 Southport Little League v. Vaughan, 734 N.E.2d 261, 272 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000) (upholding jury’s verdict that Little League volunteer was employee for purposes
of respondeat superior in child sex abuse case).
122 Walderbach v. Archdiocese of Dubuque, Inc., 730 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 2007)
(Archdiocese held not liable under respondeat superior for actions of independent contractor).
117
118
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suspected or known pedophile at work with other children is the
paradigm of negligent failure to protect children.
In circumstances in which both the tortfeasor and the
principal organization are found liable, they may be held
jointly and severally liable for damages.123 While there is
enough overlap to justify a Restatement including these issues,
different states do maintain divergent rules for apportionment
of the liability between the individual committing the abuse
and the principal organization.124
2. Criminal and Civil Fraud
A civil fraud action for covering up a case of child sex
abuse must demonstrate that there was a misrepresentation or
concealment of a material fact. According to Professor Kathleen
Brickey, “fraud has been found to encompass ‘conduct that
involves a breach of duty that results in harm to another, conduct
that involves an attempt to gain an undue advantage or to inflict
harm through misrepresentation or breach of duty, and conduct
that is inconsistent with recognized moral standards.’”125
Identifying which facts are material, as well as whether
there was a duty to reveal those facts, is critical. If a party is
not under a duty to speak, a cause of action for the failure to
disclose will not stand. However, if there is active concealment,
the duty to speak is irrelevant. A civil litigant must also prove
scienter, intent, causation, justifiable reliance, and damages
caused by the abuser.
Several federal statutes place the concept of “fraud” at
their core, but there is no singular federal crime of “fraud.”
Instead, the prosecution must fall under one of a number of
federal statutes. One who covers up child sex abuse could be

123 Conaty v. Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc., C.A. No. 08C-05-050 CLS,
2011 WL 2297712 at *1 (Del Super. Ct., May 19, 2011); Kaho’ohanohano v. Dep’t of
Human Servs., State of Haw., 178 P.3d 538, 556 (Haw. 2008).
124 For example, Kentucky dictates that liability be apportioned to each joint
tortfeasor. Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286, 291 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1998). On the other hand, Colorado mandates that liability be apportioned in
proportion to the tortfeasors’ respective fault. Bohrer v. DeHart, 943 P.2d 1220, 1231
(Colo. App. 1996).
125 Laura Russell, Note, Pursuing Criminal Liability for the Church and Its
Decision Makers for Their Role in Priest Sexual Abuse, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 885, 900
(2003). See generally KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME,
CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2002); KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY (2d ed. 1984).
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prosecuted under conspiracy to defraud, mail or wire fraud,
securities fraud, etc.126
Criminal fraud constitutes a wrong against the people as a
whole, not simply a single individual; the federal government
prosecutes on behalf of the public good. In contrast, civil fraud
cases must target an individual who has committed a private
wrong that offends or causes damage to the plaintiff’s interests.
A civil action may be maintained in tandem with a
criminal prosecution.127 However, some states maintain strict
rules against placing a party in the position of potential selfincrimination and other privileges. In these states, such as
Oregon,128 a civil litigant typically may prefer to wait to file a civil
lawsuit until the end of the criminal prosecution.
IV.

SAFETY NET FOR CHILDREN ABUSED WITHIN THE HOME

While the recovery process for children who have been
sexually abused varies in duration, there is one known fact: a
child cannot start the healing process until he or she has been
able to identify the abuse as a product of the past. Given the
finality associated with termination of parental rights it is
understandable that courts are hesitant in issuing such orders
carelessly. However, the legal complexities involved in such
determinations can lead to continued abuse. Unfortunately,
situations of continual abuse are not just limited to situations of
familial custody, but have also been infiltrating the foster care
systems. Children should feel safest at home, and in order to
ensure the comfort of safety, the courts may need to reform the
way in which child abuse claims are adjudicated.
A.

Family Court Issues

Although there has been some legislative reform leading
courts to terminate a parent’s right to custody after being
convicted of sexual abuse, most jurisdictions do not
automatically terminate the parental rights upon the finding of
abuse.129 Rather, a court must conduct a hearing to determine
See, e.g., John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 734 N.W.2d 827 (Wis. 2007).
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY U.S.A. Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 104 (2d Cir. 2012).
128 United States v. Oberdorfer, No. 06:12-cr-00578-HU, 2013 WL 1760867, at
*3 (D. Or. Apr. 24, 2013).
129 Grounds for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, CHILD WELFARE
INFORMATION GATEWAY 3 (Jan. 2013), https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_
policies/statutes/groundtermin.pdf. (Explaining that in approximately 24 States and
Puerto Rico, a parent’s rights can be terminated if he or she has been convicted of
126
127
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the appropriateness of revoking the parental right of the
accused.130 Given that these hearings are in the province of a
state’s Family Court, the requirements for termination of
rights may vary from state to state. However, the Supreme
Court has established a minimum evidentiary standard to be
applied regarding the termination of parental rights.131 Under
the Court’s standard, the evidence provided against the parent
in question must be clear and convincing.132
There are, of course, several issues implicated by the
additional hearing used to determine the accused’s parental
rights. Most significantly, such proceedings subject the abused
child to a “double dose of abuse.”133 Testimony of the victim may
be crucial to satisfying the clear and convincing standard.134 But
testifying may be an all-too-difficult task for the victim, who will
have to relive the traumatic experience. The second issue
implicated is the inability, under traditional evidentiary hearsay
rules, to introduce hearsay testimony when the victim is unable
or unwilling to testify.135 Fortunately, however, many states have
adjusted their hearsay rules to allow for the hearsay statements
of the victim, as they are highly relevant to the findings of the
court.136 Regardless of the issues, it is imperative that the courts
put the safety of the child as the first priority.
In addition, the number of cases in which one parent
accuses the other of sexually abusing their child continues to
rise.137 Although many claims of this nature are accurate and are
thereby an imperative part of the custody litigation, some of these
claims can be strategically fabricated to gain a favorable opinion

committing sexual abuse or another sexual offense. In 15 States, a conviction for rape or
sexual assault that results in the conception of the child is a ground for termination of
rights. Being required to register as a sex offender constitutes a ground in five States.)
130 Understanding
Child Welfare and the Courts, CHILD WELFARE
INFORMATION GATEWAY 2-4 (June 2011), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/
cwandcourts.pdf.
131 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
132 Id. at 748.
133 Karla-Dee Clark, Note, Innocent Victims and Blind Justice: Children’s
Rights to be Free from Child Sex Abuse, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS., 214, 271 (1990).
134 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769.
135 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 827 (1990) (holding that the victim’s
statements to her pediatrician were inadmissible in court as hearsay).
136 See Timothy L. Arcaro, Child Victims of Sexual Abuse and the Law, 12 MICH.
CHILD WELFARE L. J. 2, 10 (2009), available at http://chanceatchildhood.msu.edu/
pdf/CWLJ_sp09.pdf.
137 Deborah H. Patterson, Note, The Other Victim: The Falsely Accused Parent
in a Sexual Abuse Custody Case, 30 J. FAM. L. 919, 920 (1992).

420

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2

from the custodial decision maker.138 It is nearly impossible to
quantify the number of false allegations made in custodial
hearings, but there are certain issues that must be addressed to
help prevent such statements.
While parents may fabricate claims to gain a favorable
custody decision, it is unusual for a child to fabricate a sexual
abuse allegation.139 Studies suggest that intentionally false
claims of child abuse made by children account for significantly
less than one percent of all such claims.140 In fact, children are
much more likely to understate the extent of abuse, which is
highlighted by the alarming number of child abuse claims that
go unreported.141 There is concern in custodial cases where one
of the parents may be fabricating the allegations, which plays
into the hotly debated issue of “parental alienation syndrome,”
which is discussed in the Defenses section of this article.
For example, to ensure the accuracy of statements about
abuse, it is imperative for the reporting agency to follow strict
and unified standards. Studies show that an overwhelming
majority of agencies do not use the proper procedures when
taking statements from those involved in custodial disputes.142
In fact, some agencies do not even have established protocol.143
One theory is that this haphazard method of investigating leads
the agency official to “err on the side of caution.”144 Although it is
theoretically impossible to absolutely prevent false allegations,
the number of such incidents can be decreased with adherence to
stricter agency protocol.
There is also a need for adequate training of mandated
reporters and the agencies that receive reports. The leading
expert in the field, Victor Vieth, founder of the National Child
Protection Training Center, explains that though there are a
variety of reasons why mandated reporters do not report, “When a
report is not made, not only is the abuse of a given child likely to

138 Patricia L. Martin, The Sacrifice of a Parent: An Analysis of Parental
Rights Related to False Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse, 7 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. &
CLINICAL L. 251, 254 (2005).
139 How Often Do Children’s Reports of Abuse Turn Out to be False?,
LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.leadershipcouncil.org/1/res/csa-acc.html (last visited
Sept. 22, 2013).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Martin, supra note 138, at 256.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 257.

2014]

RESTATEMENT OF CHILD SEX ABUSE

421

continue, but the chances an offender will violate other children
also increases.”145
B.

Inadequacies and Dangers of Foster Care

While it was originally intended to protect some of the
nation’s most vulnerable children, the reality is that the state
foster care systems are plagued with abuse. Generally, the state
functions as the de facto parent of a foster child.146 Consequently,
the state has assumed the responsibility of locating a safe home
for the child, and has a continued obligation to ensure the safety
of the child’s environment.147 Unfortunately, government
practices have been inadequate to protect children.148 First, prior
to placement, the agency should screen potential homes. While
investigating prospective foster parents, the agency must
employ careful measures to ensure a child’s welfare. Second, the
agency must be sure to place children in appropriate homes.
Third, the agency must provide adequate supervision of the
foster homes. Of course, there are state regulations that have
certain requirements for the agency workers.149 However, to
ensure a child’s safety, all such requirements—and likely
more—must be strictly followed, and often are not.
In order to understand a child’s ability to bring suit
against the state when foster care abuse does occur, we must
first determine which type of claim is at suit. In situations
where a foster child has been abused, the child is able to bring
constitutional claims.150 Given the nature of the suit, the child
may bring such a claim against the state. The Fourteenth
Amendment not only protects a foster child’s liberty interest, but
it also grants him or her protection from harm inflicted in the
foster care system.151 As prescribed by the Fourteenth
145 Victor I. Vieth et al., Lessons from Penn State: A Call to Implement A New
Pattern of Training for Mandated Reporters and Child Protection Professionals, 3 CENTER
PIECE: NATIONAL CHILD PROTECTION TRAINING CENTER 2 (2012), available at
http://www.ncptc.org/vertical/sites/%7B8634A6E1-FAD2-4381-9C0D-5DC7E93C9410%7D/
uploads/Vol_3_Issue_3__4.pdf.
146 See Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
147 Id.; See Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1440 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating
that a state official’s duty to provide adequate care to a foster child generally
terminates once the foster child is officially adopted).
148 See Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Government Liability for Abuse of Children in
Foster Care, 2 Ann.2005 ATLA-CLE 1743 (2005).
149 Id.
150 See Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2010).
151 See Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 501 (9th Cir. 1997); see also
Campbell v. Burt, 141 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 1998).

422

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2

Amendment, all persons have a conditional right to be free from
intrusions on personal integrity.152 Moreover, eight federal courts
of appeal have held that foster children have a constitutional
right to safe conditions of confinement.153 The Circuits that
observe this constitutional right also hold that a foster child has
a right to be protected by their governmental custodians from
injuries by third parties.154
It has long been recognized that a governmental agency
can be held accountable for the violation of a child’s protected
liability interests.155 For example, since 1981 the Second Circuit
has held that a state agency can be held liable for indifference
to a foster child’s right of adequate supervision.156
In situations where the state assumes control over an
individual, such as in the context of foster care, an affirmative
duty is triggered by which the state is mandated to provide
protection to that person.157 When the state provides inadequate
protection, the individual’s due process rights may be violated by
the state’s “deliberate indifference” to its duty to protect. The
threshold requirement for indifference varies among the
jurisdictions. For instance, the Ninth Circuit requires that the
action “shock the conscience” to meet the requisite indifference
triggering the violation of a child’s liberty interest.158
In addition, in some jurisdictions an abused foster child
may also bring a tort claim against the state.159 Historically, all
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
See Kubitschek, supra note 148, at 2 (referring to Miller v. Gammie, 335
F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 2000); Norfleet v. Ark.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1993); Yvonne L. v. N.M. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1992); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902
F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990); K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990);
Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1065 (1989); Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981).
154 See Kubitschek, supra note 148, at 2 (referring to Miller v. Gammie, 335
F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 2000); Norfleet v. Ark.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1993); Yvonne L. v. N.M. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1992); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902
F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990); K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990);
Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1065 (1989); Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981).
155 See Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1379 (9th Cir. 1992).
156 Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d at 147.
157 See Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir. 1995).
158 See Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that to
violate due process, state officials must act with such deliberate indifference to the
liberty interest that their actions “shock the conscience”); see also Kennedy v. City of
Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1064 (9th Cir. 2006) (defining conduct that shocks the
conscience as deliberate indifference to a known danger or so obvious as to imply
knowledge of danger).
159 See Kubitschek, supra note 148, at 1.
152
153
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states were immune from suit.160 While some states are still
protected by sovereign immunity, many have since waived
their immunity, making it possible for foster children to bring
suit.161 In states where immunity has been waived, the child
can make a claim against, among other parties, the state.162 In
states where absolute immunity is still present, the foster child
can make a claim against the individual government employee
if the employee’s failure to safeguard the child led to a violation
of constitutional rights.163
There are two different liability standards applicable to
the tort claim of a plaintiff in the government’s custody. Several
circuits adhere to some version of the deliberate indifference
standard.164 Under this standard, a defendant is deliberately
indifferent when he or she disregards a risk of harm of which he
or she knew or should have known.165 Of course, what is necessary
to reach the deliberate indifference standard varies among the
jurisdictions recognizing this approach.166 For instance, the
Second Circuit has ruled that deliberate indifference “cannot exist
absent some knowledge triggering an affirmative duty to act,”167
whereas the Fourth Circuit has mandated that officials must have
ignored a danger for which they were placed on notice before the
court will find deliberate indifference.168 Moreover, most
jurisdictions allow the indifference to be inferred, with the most
typical inference resulting from grossly negligent behavior.169

U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
See Kubitschek, supra note 148, at 2.
162 Id.
163 See L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1992).
164 The Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
each phrased the deliberate indifference test along the same lines. See H.A.L. ex rel.
Lewis v. Foltz, 551 F.3d 1227, 1231 (11th Cir. 2008) (assigning liability if the official
was “deliberately indifferent to a known and substantial risk to the child of serious
harm”); J.H. ex rel. Higgin v. Johnson, 346 F.3d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he
plaintiffs must not only prove their injuries but must also prove that the state actors
knew of or suspected the specific risk facing plaintiffs and consciously ignored it or
failed to stop the abuse once it was discovered.”); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 811-12
(3d Cir. 2000) (defining deliberate indifference as “conduct [that] shocks the conscience”
while assuming that the “should have known” standard applies); White by White v.
Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1997) (including a requirement that state
officials “were plainly placed on notice of a danger and chose to ignore the danger
notwithstanding the notice”); Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134,
145 (2d Cir. 1981) (explaining that deliberate indifference “cannot exist absent some
knowledge triggering an affirmative duty to act”).
165 See Nicini, 212 F.3d at 811-12.
166 See Kubitschek, supra note 148, at 3.
167 See Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d at 145.
168 See White by White, 112 F.3d at 737.
169 See Kubitschek, supra note 148, at 3.
160
161
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The other standard is the professional judgment standard.
This standard, which focuses on a professional caretaker, is
implicated when the professional’s decision is a substantial
departure from accepted practice or standards.170 The presence of
this departure leads to a violation of the foster child’s
constitutional rights.171
While it is appropriate for each jurisdiction to adhere to
its own liability standard, there is one aspect of the adjudication
process that must be unified across the entire justice system:
mandating reporting agencies to follow strict and unified
standards. By adequately training mandated reporters and
agencies, each state will not only be protecting its employees,
but they will also be ensuring that all claims of abuse are given
the attention they require for the protection of children.
V.

RULES OF EVIDENCE IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
PROCEEDINGS

While they may differ in their details, all courts are
subject to evidentiary rules that are intended to fairly administer
all judicial proceedings. Though discovery rules vary across
jurisdictions, there are several pillars that are almost universal,
for instance, the rule against hearsay. While the general rule
against hearsay continues to be a staple in almost every
jurisdiction’s evidentiary rules, like most other judicial doctrines,
it is subject to specific exceptions. It is also particularly important
in proceedings relating to child sex abuse.
A.

Federal Rule of Evidence 414—Similar Crimes in Child
Molestation Cases

Federal courts currently allow past convictions of child
molestation to be admitted as evidence against the defendant in
a child molestation case.172 The vast majority of other convictions
may not be admitted, except for the purpose of demonstrating
elements such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
and knowledge, in the commission of a crime.173 However, Federal
Rule of Evidence 414 specifies previous convictions of child
molestation as an exception to the general rule of evidence.
170
171
172
173

Id.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 414(a).
Id. at 404(b)(2).
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Despite arguments to the contrary, it has been
determined repeatedly that Rule 414 is constitutional.174 The
application of this rule does not violate the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment;175 it does not impermissibly
deprive defendants accused of the sexual abuse of a minor of
the same rights enjoyed by other defendants accused of other
crimes.176 Similarly, “Rule 414 does not violate the Eighth
Amendment, [because it] does not impose criminal punishment
at all; it is merely an evidentiary rule.”177 Those accused of
sexual child abuse are not guaranteed a right to a trial free
from relevant prejudicial evidence.178 When the proposed
evidence is relevant to the charge at hand, and is not overly
prejudicial, it may be used in assessing the character of the
defendant.179
If a prosecutor intends to introduce past convictions of
sexual child abuse into evidence, the prosecutor must provide
the defendant with prior notice. Currently Rule 414 requires
that the prosecution notify the defendant at least 15 days prior
to the trial or at a later time that the court allows for good
cause.180 This ensures that the inclusion of such evidence does
not violate the constitutional rights of the defendant.
To guarantee that Rule 414 survives constitutional
attack, the evidence admitted under the rule must not be
overly prejudicial. As a result, in all cases, the application of
Rule 414, and thus the inclusion of past convictions of child
sexual abuse, is subject to judicial discretion.181 Though not
specifically identified in Rule 414, the analysis of whether to
allow evidence of such past convictions is subject to the
standard balancing test, weighing the probative value of the
evidence against the prejudicial effect as determined under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.182 In the event that the evidence
is overly prejudicial, such as explicit photographs depicting the
previous crime, a judge may choose to exclude the evidence
despite the prosecution’s attempted application of Rule 414.
For past crimes to be included, it is not necessary for the
current and past crimes to be identical. Currently, federal courts
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 883.
Id. at 884.
LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1026.
Id. at 1027.
FED. R. EVID. 414(b).
Id. at 1028.
LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1027.
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may admit previous convictions of like crimes that demonstrate
the propensity of the defendant to engage in sexual activities
which victimize children.183 In addition to crimes relating to the
direct sexual abuse of children, which vary by element, past
convictions regarding child pornography may also be admitted
against the defendant.184
Past convictions of like or identical convictions may also
be admitted into evidence regardless of the date of the previous
convictions. While other evidentiary rules specify limits on the
extent into which the past may be delved, there are no
presumptive time limits for previous crimes relating to the
sexual abuse of a child.185 No such limitations are included in
Rule 414, nor have any been established through its subsequent
judicial application.186
B.

Alternate Options to Rule 414

While a state judiciary can certainly enact its own
judicial rule similar to that of Rule 414, the vast majority of
states have not yet adopted rules of evidence patterned after
Rule 414. Currently, California, Louisiana, and Texas have
enacted evidentiary rules based on Rule 414.187 In many state
courts, however, the common law doctrine of the “lustful
disposition” exception, codified in Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b), has arisen.188 Thus, previous crimes of the sexual abuse of
a child may be admitted, subject to an appropriate balancing test,
as confirmation of a defendant’s lustful disposition.189 In many
instances, for this exception to apply, the evidence must
demonstrate a sexual desire for the specific victim.190 In addition,

183 Id. at 1027-28 (explaining the relevant factors to consider in “whether to
admit [propensity] evidence” include “(1) ‘the similarity of the prior acts to the acts
charged,’ (2) the ‘closeness in time of the prior acts to the acts charged,’ (3) ‘the
frequency of the prior acts,’ (4) the ‘presence or lack of intervening circumstances,’ and
(5) ‘the necessity of the evidence beyond the testimonies already offered at trial.’”).
184 United States v. Sturm, 590 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1327 (D. Colo. 2008).
185 United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding
“there is no time limit beyond which prior sex offenses by a defendant are
inadmissible”).
186 Id.
187 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West 2003); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 412.2
(2004); TEX. R. EVID. 609 (1998).
188 LeMay, 206 F.3d at 1025.
189 Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged
Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 218 (1993).
190 Id. at 193.
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the evidence must represent conduct that would naturally be
interpreted as an expression of sexual desire.191
States that employ the “lustful disposition” exception may
in fact allow substantially more evidence to be admitted against a
defendant than a court applying Rule 414. While Rule 414 allows
specifically for the admission of past convictions, the “lustful
disposition” exception through Rule 404(b) allows for additional
character evidence, which may not have escalated into a
conviction, but is nonetheless seen as applicable to the current
case.192 Thus, through the use of Rule 404(b), coupled with the
Rule 403 balancing analysis, most states have not deemed a
separate rule, such as Rule 414, a necessity.
While evidentiary rules are necessary to ensure fairness in
the judicial process, the courts have also remained cognizant of
the fragile nature of child sex abuse cases. The nature of child sex
abuse crimes makes them “[t]he most difficult to prove in
court,”193 which is magnified by the stigma and legal ramifications
associated with a conviction. Society, however, has a need to
protect its children, and therefore evidentiary rules allowing for a
more efficient child sex abuse proceeding are necessary.
VI.

ENHANCED FEDERAL SENTENCING REQUIREMENTS

Many federal statutes prohibiting the sexual abuse of a
child provide modification to the statutory minimums in
sentencing. While federal sentencing is multi-faceted and subject
to judicial discretion, many statutes identify the minimum and
maximum sentences the court may apply following a conviction
for violating the statute. In many cases the statutory guidelines
for sentencing are increased, identifying a desire to deter
recidivism among those who have been convicted of crimes
concerning the sexual abuse of a child.
Currently, in the conviction of aggravated sexual abuse, in
which a previous like conviction exists, the maximum sentence is
doubled.194 Similarly, conviction of the sexual exploitation of
children, with a like conviction, increases the minimum sentence
from 15 to 25 years imprisonment, and the maximum from 30 to
50 years.195
Id. at 192.
Id.
193 Cylinda C. Parga, Legal and Scientific Issues Surrounding Victim
Recantation in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 804 (2008).
194 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2012).
195 Id. § 2251(e) (2012).
191
192
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Currently, previous convictions need not correspond
directly to the specific statute violated for the statutory
sentencing guidelines to be increased.196 For the most part,
judicial discretion is employed in determining the applicability of
a previous conviction to the provision of the statute allowing for
the sentencing increase.197 However, recent developments indicate
that the range of applicable convictions may be narrowing. For
example, 18 U.S.C. § 2252, entitled “Certain activities relating to
material involving the sexual exploitation of minors,” was
replaced by the Child Protection Act of 2012.198 While Section
2252 allows past convictions “under the laws of any State” to
trigger the appropriate sentencing increase, the Child Protection
Act of 2012 removes “state” convictions from the list of violations
that may trigger increased sentencing guidelines. In this way,
federal legislation may indicate an intent to erode the application
of increased sentencing standards.
VII.

DEFENSES

A.

Parental Alienation Syndrome and the Perils of Custody
by the Abusing Parent

Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) is a hotly
contested theory promulgated by Dr. Richard Gardner in the
1980s. According to Dr. Gardner, PAS’s primary manifestation
is the child’s campaign of denigration against the parent—a
campaign that has no justification.199 The supposed “disorder
results from the combination of indoctrinations by the
alienating parent [(the parent influencing the child)] and the
child’s own contributions to the vilification of the alienated
parent.”200 In other words, the alienating parent may influence
the child through both direct and indirect actions to
disproportionately dislike the other, alienated parent.
PAS has become a point of controversy in numerous
custody disputes involving child sex abuse because it has been
the basis, at times, for transferring custody from the alienating
parent to the alienated parent accused of sexual abuse.201 For
United States v. Sinerius, 504 F.3d 737, 744 (9th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Wiles, 642 F.3d 1198, 1202 (9th Cir. 2011).
198 Child Protection Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-206, 126 Stat. 1490 (2012).
199 Richard A. Gardner, Parental Alienation Syndrome: Sixteen Years Later,
45 ACADEMY FORUM 1, 10 (2001).
200 Id.
201 See John A. v. Bridget M., 798 N.Y.S.2d 345 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2004); Karen
B. v. Clyde M., 574 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991); see also J.F. v. L.F., 694
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instance, in Karen B. v. Clyde M., an infant daughter made
statements suggesting sexual abuse perpetrated by her
father.202 The mother filed for sole custody of the daughter
based upon those claims.203 The court, citing PAS, found the
claims to be baseless and awarded sole custody to the father.204
Similarly, in John A. v. Bridget M., sexual abuse allegations
levied against the father resulted in awarding custody of the
children to the father on the basis of PAS.205 There were no
confirmed findings of abuse in either case.
The DSM, otherwise known as the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, provides a common
language and standard criteria for the classification of mental
disorders. The DSM IV does not include PAS as there was not
enough scientific evidence to warrant its inclusion.206 In
addition, PAS is routinely criticized for lacking a scientific
basis and failing to meet the burden of proof to merit
acceptance as a scientific hypothesis.207
B.

First Amendment Issues: When a Religious Entity Is a
Defendant

In 2002, the Boston Globe broke the story of a concerted
cover up of child sex abuse by bishops in the Catholic Church.208
Before then, there were isolated reports of abuse by individual
priests, with the most disturbing being the abuse of dozens of
boys by Louisiana priest Gilbert Gauthe. Gauthe was convicted
in 1985 and served 10 years in prison.209 In the aftermath of the
Globe’s story, the issue of institutional cover-up came to the fore
across the country, though editors at other newspapers resisted
N.Y.S.2d 592, 599-600 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999) (holding that evidence of parental
alienation syndrome alone would allow for awarding sole custody to the father).
202 Karen B., 574 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 272.
205 John A., 798 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
206 Richard A. Gardner, Denial of Parental Alienation Syndrome Also Harms
Women, 30 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 3, 195-96 (2002).
207 See Richard Bond, The Lingering Debate Over the Parental Alienation
Syndrome Phenomenon, 4 JOURNAL OF CHILD CUSTODY 1, 37-54 (2008); Robert E.
Emery, Parental Alienation Syndrome: Proponents Bear Burden of Proof, 43 FAM. CT.
REV. 1, 8-13 (2005).
208 INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS IN THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH 3 (2003).
209 Jonathan Friendly, Roman Catholic Church Discusses Abuse of Children by
Priests, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1986, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1986/05/04/us/
roman-catholic-church-discusses-abuse-of-children-by-priests.html. For a fictionalized
account written by one who was at the forefront of the Gauthe case, read RAY MOUTON,
IN GOD’S HOUSE (2012).
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the story. For example, reporter Marie Rhode was removed from
the religion beat because she brought a similar story of cover-up
to the editorial board of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel.210
The Roman Catholic Church is the largest religious
institution in the world.211 With its numbers, and its mandatory
policies of shielding predators from law enforcement and public
disclosure while permitting them access to more children, this
institution was the perfect one to establish the paradigm for the
press and the public of institutional cover-up. Once the factual
outlines became visible, reporters, prosecutors, and survivors in
other institutions took notice. The result was an avalanche of
information about religious institution-based abuse, spanning
every religion imaginable, from the Catholic Church to Orthodox
Jews, especially the Hasidim, to Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists,
and Latter-Day Saints.212 Close on the heels of the religious
institutions were the secular institutions including Penn State,213

210 Marie Rhode, Justice Prosser’s Link to Priest Case Assailed: As DA in ’79, He
Decided Not to Prosecute, Records Indicate, JSONLINE (Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.jsonline.com/
news/milwaukee/29510659.html; see also Bruce Murphy, The Catholic Cover-up, MILWAUKEE
MAG. (Feb. 14, 2007), available at http://www.milwaukeemag.com/article/242011TheCatholicCoverup.
211 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html (last visted June 13, 2013).
212 REPORT OF THE GRAND JURY, IN RE COUNTY INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY OF
SEPT. 17, 2003, COURT OF COM. PL., FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PA., CRIM. TRIAL DIV.,
MISC. NO. 03-00239, at 4 (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://media.philly.com/
documents/grand_jury_report.pdf; REPORT OF THE GRAND JURY, IN RE COUNTY
INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY XXIII, COURT OF COM. PL., FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PA.,
CRIM. TRIAL DIV., MISC. NO. 0009901-2008, at 1 (Jan. 21, 2011), available at
http://www.phila.gov/districtattorney/PDFs/clergyAbuse2-finalReport.pdf; Jon Hurdle &
Erik Eckholm, Cardinal’s Aide Is Found Guilty in Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/us/philadelphias-msgr-william-j-lynn-is-convicted-ofallowing-abuse.html; Ross Levitt & Susan Candiotti, Philadelphia Priest Abuse Trial to
Draw Plenty of Attention, CNN (Mar. 25, 2012), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-0325/justice/justice_pennsylvania-priest-trial_1_priest-abuse-defrocked-priest-monsignorwilliam-lynn; Marci A. Hamilton, The “Licentiousness” in Religious Organizations and Why
it is Not Protected under Religious Liberty Constitutional Provisions, 18 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 953, 962-63 (2010); Amy Neustein & Michael Lesher, Justice Interrupted: How
Rabbis Can Interfere with the Prosecution of Sex Offenders—And Strategies for How to Stop
Them, in TEMPEST IN THE TEMPLE: JEWISH COMMUNITIES & CHILD SEX SCANDALS 197
(Amy Neustein ed., 2009); MICHAEL J. SALAMON, ABUSE IN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY:
RELIGIOUS AND COMMUNAL FACTORS THAT UNDERMINE THE APPREHENSION OF OFFENDERS
AND THE TREATMENT OF VICTIMS 43 (2011); Hella Winston, Hynes Issues Warning To Rabbis
On Abuse Policy, JEWISH WEEK (May 29, 2012), http://www.thejewishweek.com/
news/new_york/hynes_issues_warning_rabbis_abuse_policy.
213 Nick Carbone, Jerry Sandusky, Guilty of 45 Counts of Child Sexual Abuse,
Faces 442 Years in Prison, TIME (June 22, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/06/22/jerrysandusky-guilty-of-45-counts-of-child-sexual-abuse-faces-442-years-in-prison;
Susan
Candiotti, Disturbing E-mails Could Spell More Trouble for Penn State Officials, CNN (July
2, 2012, 10:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/30/justice/penn-state-emails/index.html.
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Syracuse,214 the Citadel,215 Horace Mann,216 Poly Prep,217 the Los
Angeles public school system,218 and many others.
Religious institutions charged with abetting and covering
up sexual abuse of children often raise First Amendment
defenses. Religious organizations have routinely invoked the
First Amendment to avoid discovery, liability, and damages. But
the law is showing less willingness to accept these defenses. The
law has developed in this arena to the point now that there is
widespread consensus: the First Amendment is no defense to the
application of neutral, generally applicable criminal or civil tort
laws, e.g., negligence.219
At one point, lawyers proposed a theory of “clergy
malpractice,” but that entangled the courts in calibrating and
determining religious law. Thus, arguments opposing “clergy
malpractice” as the measure of duty and care were successful. Most
states now approach these cases through analysis of the conduct
taken, without reference to religious belief, and measure it by
neutral criminal or tort principles.
Three states do recognize a First Amendment defense
for religious organizations in child sex abuse cases, including
Missouri, Utah, and Wisconsin.220 In Wisconsin, at least, it does
not operate as absolute immunity, because the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has now recognized a fraud cause of action
against religious organizations for the cover up of child sex
abuse.221 The trend is clear, though, in favor of rejection of a
214 Pete Thamel, Syracuse Fires Fine After New Allegations in Molestation
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/sports/
ncaabasketball/bernie-fine-fired-by-syracuse-in-wake-of-molestation-allegations.html.
215 The Citadel Apologizes for Not Reporting Allegation of Child Sex Abuse,
CNN (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/14/us/south-carolina-citadel-abuse/
index.html?_s=PM:US.
216 William Glaberson, Legal Options Limited for Alumni who Told of Abuse at
Horace Mann, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/
nyregion/legal-options-limited-for-abuse-victims-at-the-horace-mann-school.html?_r=1.
217 Mosi Secret, Suit Settled Over Claims of Sex Abuse at Poly Prep, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2012, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/28/
nyregion/sexual-abuse-case-at-poly-prep-in-brooklyn-is-settled.html.
218 Jason Kandel, Senator Calls for Investigation into School Sex Abuse Cases,
NBC LOCAL NEWS (Jan. 28, 2013, 10:16 PM PDT), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/
local/Senator-to-Call-for-Independent-Investigation-Rampant-Sex-Abuse-LAUSD-Schools188697991.html; Christine Pelisek, Los Angeles’s School Nightmare: Another Sex-Abuse
Scandal, THE DAILY BEAST (Jan. 25, 2013, 4:45 AM EST), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2013/01/25/los-angeles-s-school-nightmare-another-sex-abuse-scandal.html.
219 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990);
Rashedi v. Gen. Bd. of Church of Nazarene, 54 P.3d 349, 354-55 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
220 Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246-48 (Mo. 1997); Franco v. Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 208-09 (Utah 2001); L.L.N. v. Clauder,
563 N.W.2d 434, 445 (Wis. 1997).
221 John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 734 N.W.2d 827, 842 (Wis. 2007).
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First Amendment defense in these cases. The most
comprehensive and recent analysis by a state supreme court to
date is Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis.222
The free exercise and establishment clauses of the First
Amendment are implicated in cases where claims are brought
against a religious organization, such as a church, temple,
synagogue, or mosque. The establishment clause does not
preclude the court’s exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction over
such claims.223 The clause also does not bar the examination of
religious organization documents relating to the underlying
facts that are the basis of the claim.224
In general, most courts have ruled that the First
Amendment does not bar civil claims arising from the sexual
assault or abuse of a minor or adult by an employee/member/leader
of a religious organization.225 Courts may hear claims regarding
tortious conduct where a resolution does not require interpretation
of religious doctrine or religious duties.226
Secondly, common law duties, predicated on secular
conduct, do not involve or implicate religious beliefs. As a result,
in most states, the religious beliefs of an organization do not
excuse it from abiding by a valid law prohibiting conduct that
the state may regulate. For example, tort liability may be
imposed without violating the First Amendment so long as it
derives from neutral, generally applicable tort law.227 However,
where interpretation of religious doctrine is required, the First
Amendment bars tort liability.228 As a result, most courts have
ruled that the First Amendment does not bar civil claims
arising from the sexual assault or abuse of a minor or adult by
an employee/member/leader of a religious organization.229
Courts may hear claims regarding tortious conduct where a
resolution does not require interpretation of religious doctrine
or religious duties.230
363 S.W.3d 436 (Tenn. 2012).
Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 351 (Fla. 2002).
224 Antioch Temple, Inc. v. Parekh, 422 N.E.2d 1337, 1342 n.10 (Mass. 1981)
(“Examination of [ecclesiastical] documents is not, in and of itself, an impermissible
intrusion into the religious realm . . . .”), rev’d on other grounds, Callahan v. First
Congregational Church of Haverhill, 808 N.E.2d 301, 306-09 (Mass. 2004).
225 Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 351 n.2.
226 Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 77 (D. R.I. 1997).
227 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
531 (1993).
228 Smith, 986 F. Supp. at 77.
229 Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 351 n.2.
230 Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409 (2d
Cir. 1999) (holding the free exercise clause did not bar finding of fiduciary relationship
222
223
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Finally, the First Amendment does not prohibit recovery
for the sexual assault of a minor or adult by a
member/leader/employee of a religious organization. The
application of secular standards to secular tortious conduct by
a religious organization is constitutional.231 The state has a
strong interest in protecting children from sexual assault or
abuse and may authorize civil damages against a religious
organization that knowingly creates a situation in which such
injuries are likely to occur.232 Punitive damages, against the
individual and the religious organization, are not barred by
First Amendment guarantees or public policy.233 While the free
exercise clause protects religious beliefs and instances of
religious conduct, it does not shield religious organizations
from liability for child sex abuse where, for example, criminal
sanctions are unavailable and punitive damages against
individuals would be insufficient.234
PAS and the First Amendment have both been raised as
defenses in sex abuse cases. Fortunately, courts have been
rejecting these defenses, as they are both unmeritorious. PAS
lacks scientific standing, while the First Amendment is not a
defense to the application of neutral, generally applicable laws.
CONCLUSION
There is increasing agreement on a number of legal
rules and principles in the child sex abuse arena. SOLs across
the country are becoming increasingly liberalized, with all but
one state either lengthening or eliminating child sex abuse SOLs
entirely. Given the current trend, it is likely that all states will
eventually eliminate these SOLs, and many will adopt civil
revival legislation to create access to justice for victims whose
SOLs have expired. This development alone will increase the
number of child sex abuse cases in the future and the need for a
Restatement of Child Sex Abuse.

between diocese and parishioner for child sexual abuse by priest); Roman Catholic
Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1243 (Miss. 2005) (holding that loss of
consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are not barred by First
Amendment).
231 Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 351 n.2.
232 Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 359; Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 249 (Mo.
1997) (en banc) (“[L]iability for intentional torts can be imposed without excessively
delving into religious doctrine, polity, and practice.”).
233 Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 351 n.2.
234 Id.
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There will also be an increased likelihood of such cases,
because states are strengthening their mandatory reporting
laws, with 48 states currently requiring specific professionals
to report child abuse, and many considering increasing the
categories of those required to report. Exceptions, like the
confessional exception, have been repealed in some states, and
narrowed in others.
There are other areas where there is agreement as well,
including agreement among a majority of federal courts on the
standard to be applied when foster children sue the state for
abuse—that foster children have a constitutional right to safe
placements; that the Parental Alienation Syndrome phenomenon
is largely discredited; and that the First Amendment is no defense
to a religious employer’s negligence in creating unsafe conditions
for children. Of course, this forum is not the place to be
comprehensive, and so there are more issues to be addressed,
from child pornography and trafficking to state and federal civil
rights claims on behalf of victims.
The time is ripe, therefore, to create a Restatement of
Child Sex Abuse. There are thousands of child sex abuse cases
across the country, mostly prosecuted in state court, but also at
the federal level. As more survivors come forward, their bravery
encourages even more to do so, and, therefore, there is likely to
be a growing number of cases. The dust has settled on many of
the issues, and strong, identifiable conclusions and trends are
apparent. Lawyers, judges, public policymakers, and scholars
would benefit from a compendium of the interrelated issues
involved in these cases and an explanation of how the law has
been shaped and where it is headed.

